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Abstract
We study new classes of games, called zero-sum equivalent games and zero-sum
equivalent potential games, and prove decomposition theorems involving these classes
of games. We say that two games are “strategically equivalent” if, for every player,
the payoff differences between two strategies (holding other players’ strategies fixed)
are identical. A zero-sum equivalent game is a game that is strategically equivalent
to a zero-sum game; a zero-sum equivalent potential game is a zero-sum equivalent
game that is strategically equivalent to a common interest game. We also call a game
“normalized” if the sum of one player’s payoffs, given the other players’ strategies,
is always zero. We show that any normal form game can be uniquely decomposed
into either (i) a zero-sum equivalent game and a normalized common interest game,
or (ii) a zero-sum equivalent potential game, a normalized zero-sum game, and a
normalized common interest game, each with distinctive equilibrium properties. For
example, we show that two-player zero-sum equivalent games with finite strategy sets
generically have a unique Nash equilibrium and that two-player zero-sum equivalent
potential games with finite strategy sets generically have a strictly dominant Nash
equilibrium.
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1. Introduction
When two people start a joint venture, their interests are aligned. In the division
of a pie or unclaimed surpluses, however, someone’s gain always comes at the expense
of somebody else. So-called common interest games and zero-sum games serve as
polar models for studying these social interactions. Two games can be regarded
as “strategically equivalent” if, for every player, the payoff differences between two
strategies (holding other players’ strategies fixed) are identical. That is, in two
strategically equivalent games, strategic variables such as best responses of players
are identical.1 Potential games—a much studied class of games in the literature—
are precisely those games that are strategically equivalent to common interest games.
We also call a game “normalized” when the sum of one player’s payoffs, given the
other players’ strategies, is always zero.
We are interested in zero-sum games and their variants—(i) games that are strate-
gically equivalent to a zero-sum game, accordingly named zero-sum equivalent games,
(ii) zero-sum equivalent games which are, at the same time, equivalent to a com-
mon interest game, named zero-sum equivalent potential games and (iii) normalized
zero-sum games. Our interest in zero-sum equivalent games is motivated by their
analogous definitions to potential games. Potential games retain all the attractive
properties of common interest games (the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium and a potential function) because they are strategically equivalent to common
interest games. Thus, zero-sum equivalent games are expected to retain similar desir-
able properties of zero-sum games as well. It is well-known that two-player zero-sum
games with a finite number of strategies have mini-max strategies and admit a value
of games which are useful tools for amenable analysis of equilibrium. Recently, there
have been generalizations of these properties and characterizations for a special class
of n-player zero-sum games (Bregman and Fokin (1998); Cai et al. (2015); see Sec-
tion 3 for an extensive discussion of zero-sum equivalent games).
To study these classes of zero-sum related games, we develop decomposition meth-
ods of an arbitrary normal form game and obtain several constituent components
belonging to these classes and a special class of common interest games. Our de-
composition results provide (i) characterizations for zero-sum equivalent games as
1See Definition 2.2 and Monderer and Shapley (1996) and Weibull (1995); see also
Morris and Ui (2004) for best response equivalence.
1
4,4 -1,1 1,-1
1,-1 2,2 -2,0
-1,1 0,-2 2,2
=
2,2 -1,-1 -1,-1
-1,-1 2,2 -1,-1
-1,-1 -1,-1 2,2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=C
+
0,0 -1,1 1,-1
1,-1 0,0 -1,1
-1,1 1,-1 0,0︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Z
+
1,1 1,0 1,0
0,1 0,0 0,0
0,1 0,0 0,0︸ ︷︷ ︸
=B
+
1,1 0,1 0,1
1,0 0,0 0,0
1,0 0,0 0,0︸ ︷︷ ︸
=E
Table 1: Illustration of our four-component decomposition. This example illustrates our
main results. Here, C is a common interest game, Z is a zero-sum game (the Rock-Paper-Scissors
game), B is a game in which the first strategy is the dominant strategy, and E is called a “non-
strategic” game, in which, for every player, the payoff differences between two strategies (holding
other players’ strategies fixed) are identical (see Definition 2.1). Observe that C and Z are “nor-
malized” in the sense that the column sums and row sums of the payoffs are zeros.
well as others (e.g., Propositions 3.2, 4.1, and 4.2) and (ii) decompositions of a given
game into components with distinctive equilibrium properties (Theorem 5.1, Figure
3). Intuitively, a decomposition of an arbitrary game gives an idea of how the original
game is “close” to component games with desirable properties.
Our main results (Theorem 2.1 (ii) and Proposition 4.1) show that every normal
form game can be decomposed into four components: (i) a “normalized” common
interest component (C in Table 1), (ii) a “normalized” zero-sum component (Z in
Table 1), (iii) a zero-sum equivalent potential component—component equivalent to
both a zero-sum and common interest game (B in Table 1), and (iv) a nonstrategic
component (E in Table 1). Most popular zero-sum games, such as Rock-Paper-
Scissors games and Matching Pennies games, belong to the class of normalized zero-
sum games (see also Cyclic games in Hofbauer and Schlag (2000)).
This study makes the following contributions. We develop a more general way
of decomposing normal form games than existing methods. Existing decompo-
sition methods of normal form games, such as in Hwang and Rey-Bellet (2011),
Candogan et al. (2011), and Sandholm (2010a), are limited to finite strategy set
games, relying on decomposition methods of tensors (or matrices) or graphs. Our
new insights lie in viewing the set of all games as a Hilbert space; we use a Hilbert
space decomposition technique and obtain decomposition results of normal form
games at an abstract level, which are applicable to games with continuous strategy
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sets as well as those with finite strategy sets.2 In this way, our method shows a
unified and transparent mechanism of decompositions of games and can be easily
modified to decompose other classes of games such as Bayesian games. Further,
many problems in economics are modeled using continuous strategy games; thus our
results, such as the characterizations and the equilibrium properties of component
games, can be applied to a wide range of problems including, for example, Cournot
games and contest games.
Second, the concept of orthogonality in Hilbert space is useful in the sense that
we can naturally characterize a class of games by describing the games which are
orthogonal to it, that is their orthogonal complements. For example, the sufficiency
and necessity of the well-known Monderer and Shapley cycle condition for poten-
tial games (Theorem 2.8 in Monderer and Shapley (1996)) can be proved by showing
that this condition requires that potential games are orthogonal to all the normalized
zero-sum games. We use the orthogonality which yields a unique decomposition of
a given game into a common interest game and a zero-sum game (Kalai and Kalai,
2010) and into a normalized game and a non-strategic game (Hwang and Rey-Bellet,
2011; Candogan et al., 2011). Based on this orthogonal decomposition, we are able to
provide characterizations of games, such as zero-sum equivalent games, zero-sum po-
tential games, normalized zero-sum games, and normalized common interest games.
After our main decompositions in Section 2, we present detailed analyses of each
component game—zero-sum equivalent games, zero-sum equivalent potential games,
normalized zero-sum games, and normalized common interest games. In Section 3,
we show that zero-sum equivalent games have a Nash equilibrium and under some
(easily checkable) conditions they have a unique Nash equilibrium. We also show that
show that two-player zero-sum equivalent games with finite strategy sets generically
have a unique Nash equilibrium (Corollary 3.1). In Section 4, we study zero-sum
equivalent potential games. In particular, we show that two-player games in this
class generically possess a strictly dominant strategy (Corollary 4.3). This kind
of two-player game (game B in Table 1), which is strategically equivalent to both
a zero-sum game and a common interest game, only involves self-interactions, not
2For example, the decomposition by Candogan et al. (2011) relies on the Helmholtz decompo-
sition of flows on the graph for games with finite strategy sets and uses Moore inverses of matrix
operators. In fact, one of our previous decomposition results in Hwang and Rey-Bellet (2011) have
some overlaps with the main result in the cited paper.
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Notations Names Definitions
C Common interest games Definition 2.1
Z Zero-sum games Definition 2.1
N Normalized games Definition 2.1
E non-strategic games (define Equivalence relation) Definition 2.1
Z + E Zero-sum Equivalent games Definition 2.4
C + E potential games (Common interest Equivalent games) Definition 2.3
B = (Both) zero-sum equivalent (and) potential games Definition 2.4
(Z + E) ∩ (C + E)
D games which have a Dominant strategy for two-player games Definition 4.1
N ∩Z Normalized Zero-sum games
N ∩ C Normalized Common interest games
Table 2: Notations for the spaces of games.
interactions between two players, since a player’s payoffs depend only on her own
actions.
Putting all this together, we provide a decomposition of a two player finite game
into component games, each possessing distinctive equilibrium characteristics (The-
orem 5.1). To help readers digest the main results, we keep some important proofs
in the text; however, to streamline the presentation, we relegate some lengthy and
tedious proofs to the appendix. Also, in Appendix A, we review the basic results
about the decomposition of a Hilbert space to provide theoretical background.
2. Decomposition Theorems
In this section, we present the basic setup, provide some preliminary results and
present our main decomposition theorems.
2.1. Basic setup
An n-player game (N, S, f) is specified by a set of players, N = {1, 2, · · · , n};
a set of strategy profiles, S :=
∏n
i=1 Si, where Si is a set of strategies for player
i; and a payoff function, f := (f (1), f (2), · · · , f (n)). For each i, f (i) : S → R is a
real-valued function, with f (i)(s) specifying the payoff for player i, given a strategy
profile, s = (s1, · · · , sn). We follow the convention of writing f (i)(si, s−i) = f (i)(s),
where s−i is the strategy profile of the players other than i. We associate a finite
measure space with each set of strategies, Si, as follows. If Si is a finite set, we let
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mi be the counting measure with the natural σ-algebra of all subsets of Si. If Si is
a subset of Rdi for some di, we assume that Si is bounded and choose mi to be the
Lebesgue measure on Si with the Borel σ-algebra on Si. Thus, we have mi(Si) <∞.
We call a game with finite strategy sets simply a finite game to distinguish it from
continuous strategy games.
Given N and S, a game is uniquely specified by the vector-valued function f :=
(f (1), f (2), · · · , f (n)) which we assume to be measurable. We succinctly write an
n-fold integration as follows:∫
f (i)dm =
∫
· · ·
∫
f (i)(s1, · · · , sn)dm1(s1) · · ·dmn(sn).
We define the norm of the payoff function f by
‖f‖ := (
n∑
i=1
∫ ∣∣f (i)∣∣2 dm)1/2
and consider the space of games to be
L := {f : S → Rn measurable and ‖f‖ <∞}. (1)
For finite games, the payoff functions can be represented as matrices (or tensors), and
L is the set of all matrices (or tensors) of suitable dimensions. Existing decomposition
methods, such as those of Hwang and Rey-Bellet (2011), Candogan et al. (2011) and
Sandholm (2010a), all focus on the case of finite strategy sets, while we consider a
general strategy space which can be either finite or continuous. We also follow the
usual convention of redefining L to be the set of all equivalent classes of almost
everywhere defined integrable functions on S. Thus, whenever we state a result for
a function, f , it holds for all its equivalent functions which agree with f almost
everywhere. Our choice of the norm turns L into a Hilbert space with a scalar
product
〈f, g〉 :=
∑
i
∫
f (i)g(i)dm, (2)
which gives us 〈f, f〉 = ‖f‖2. We next introduce several classes of games of interest.
Definition 2.1. We define the following subspaces of L:
(i) The space of common interest games, C, is defined by
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C := {f ∈ L : f (i)(s) = f (j)(s) for all i, j and for all s} .
(ii) The space of zero-sum games, Z, is defined by
Z := {f ∈ L :
n∑
l=1
f (l)(s) = 0 for all s} .
(iii) The space of normalized games, N , is defined by
N := {f ∈ L :
∫
f (i)(ti, s−i)dmi(ti) = 0 for all s−i, for all i} . (3)
(iv) The space of nonstrategic games, E , is defined by
E := {h ∈ L : h(i)(si, s−i) = h(i)(s′i, s−i) for all si, s′i, s−i, for all i} . (4)
Common interest games in C and zero-sum games in Z are familiar games, mod-
eling cooperative and competitive interactions, respectively. Tractable equilibrium
analysis is possible in both classes of games via potential functions and mini-max
solutions.
To exhibit an important property of the normalized games in N , let σi denote
the uniform mixed strategy for player i; i.e., the probability measure
dσi(si) =
1
m(Si)
dmi(si). (5)
For normalized games in N , for any player, the payoff for the uniform mixed strategy
is zero against any strategy profile of her opponents. Because of this property,
normalized common interest games and normalized zero-sum games always have the
uniform mixed strategy as a Nash equilibrium (see Proposition 5.1). The term,
“normalized”, stems from this game’s being obtained by removing a “non-strategic”
component of a game—this will be explained in more detail in subsection 2.3.
By definition, for a non-strategic game in E , (also sometimes called a passive
game), the players’ payoffs do not depend on their own strategy choices (Sandholm
(2010a); Candogan et al. (2011)). Thus, each player’s strategy choice plays no role in
determining her payoff; any arbitrary strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium. Because
of this property, the players’ strategic relations remain unchanged if we add the payoff
of a non-strategic game to that of another game. This leads us to the definition of
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strategic equivalence (and thus notation, E).3
Definition 2.2. We say that game g is strategically equivalent to game f if
g = f + h for some h ∈ E
We write this relation as g ∼ f , and this is obviously an equivalence relation.
The class of potential games defined by Monderer and Shapley (1996) has re-
ceived much attention for its analytical convenience. Among the several equivalent
definitions for potential games we choose the one convenient for our purpose: poten-
tial games are those that are strategically equivalent to common interest games.
Definition 2.3. The space of potential games (common interest equivalent games)
is defined by
C + E . (6)
Recall that the notation f ∈ C+E means that f can be written as a linear combination
of a common interest game and a non-strategic game.
It is also well-known that two-player zero-sum games (as well as potential games)
have desirable properties—the value of a game, the mini-max theorem and so on. We
then expect that (i) two-player zero-sum equivalent games retain some of these prop-
erties and (ii) n-person zero-sum equivalent games may possess similar but possibly
weakened properties. As the example in Section 2.2 shows, n-player zero-sum equiv-
alent games have appealing properties, which can be useful for equilibrium analysis
(see Section 3). This leads us to consider the space of games that is strategically
equivalent to zero-sum games. Moreover, as both potential games and zero-sum
equivalent games have desirable properties, we will identify, as well, the class of
games which is simultaneously strategically equivalent to a common interest game
and a zero-sum game.
Definition 2.4. We have the following definitions:
3One can study different strategic equivalences. For example, Monderer and Shapley (1996)
introduce the concept of w− potential games in which the payoff changes are proportional for each
player. Morris and Ui (2004) also study the best response equivalence of games in which players
have the same best-responses. We choose our definition of strategic equivalence since it is most
natural with the linear structure of the space of all games.
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(i) The space of zero-sum equivalent games is defined by
Z + E (7)
(ii) The space of games that is strategically equivalent to both a common interest
game and a zero-sum game, called zero-sum equivalent potential games, is denoted
by B.
2.2. Motivating examples
Example 1 (Strategic equivalence: Cournot oligopoly).
Consider a quasi-Cournot oligopoly game with a linear demand function for which
the payoff function for the i-th player, for i = 1, · · · , n, is given by
f (i)(s) = (α− β
n∑
j=1
sj)si − ci(si) ,
where α, β > 0, ci(si) ≥ 0 for all si ∈ [0, s¯] for all i and for some sufficiently large s¯.4
It is well-known that this game is a potential game (Monderer and Shapley 1996);
i.e., it is strategically equivalent to a common interest game but is also strategically
equivalent to a zero sum game (if n ≥ 3). To show this, when n = 3, we write the
payoff function as
f (1)f (2)
f (3)

 =

(α− βs1)s1 − c1(s1)(α− βs2)s2 − c2(s2)
(α− βs3)s3 − c3(s3)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
Self-Interaction
−

βs1s2βs1s2
0


︸ ︷︷ ︸
Interactions
between players 1 and 2
−

βs1s30
βs1s3


︸ ︷︷ ︸
Interactions
between players 1 and 3
−

 0βs2s3
βs2s3


︸ ︷︷ ︸
Interactions
between players 2 and 3
(8)
The self-interaction term is strategically equivalent to both a common interest
4Here, quasi-Cournot games allow the negativity of the price (Monderer and Shapley, 1996).
Further, we can choose s¯ to ensure that the unique Nash equilibrium lies in the interior [0, s¯]
as follows. Suppose that ci(si) is linear; that is, ci(si) = cisi for all i. We assume that α >
nmini ci − (n− 1)maxi ci, which ensures that the Nash equilibrium, s∗, is positive. If we choose s¯
such that (n+ 1)βs¯ > α− nmini ci + (n− 1)maxi ci, then s∗i ∈ (0, s¯) for all i.
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game and a zero-sum game, as the following two payoffs show
 (α− βs1)s1 − c1(s1) +(α− βs2)s2 − c2(s2) +(α− βs3)s3 − c3(s3)(α− βs1)s1 − c1(s1) +(α− βs2)s2 − c2(s2) +(α− βs3)s3 − c3(s3)
(α− βs1)s1 − c1(s1) +(α− βs2)s2 − c2(s2) +(α− βs3)s3 − c3(s3)


(9)
and 
(α− βs1)s1 − c1(s1)− [(α− βs2)s2 − c2(s2)](α− βs2)s2 − c2(s2)− [(α− βs3)s3 − c3(s3)]
(α− βs3)s3 − c3(s3)− [(α− βs1)s1 − c1(s1)]

 . (10)
The payoffs in (9) and (10) are payoffs for a common interest game and a zero-sum
game, respectively. They are obtained from the self-interaction term by adding pay-
offs that do not depend on the player’s own strategy and thus they are strategically
equivalent (see Definition 2.2).
In a similar way, the payoff component describing the interactions between players
1 and 2 is strategically equivalent to the payoff for a common interest game and the
payoff for a zero-sum game. For example,
βs1s2βs1s2
0

 ,

βs1s2βs1s2
βs1s2

 , and

 βs1s2βs1s2
−2βs1s2

 (11)
are all strategically equivalent. A similar computation holds for the last two terms
in equation (8) involving the interactions between players 1 and 3 as well as between
players 2 and 3. As a consequence, the quasi-Cournot oligopoly game is strategically
equivalent to both a common interest game and a zero-sum game.
Example 2 (Zero-sum equivalent games: Contest games).
Our next example is a contest game (Konrad, 2009), which is a zero-sum equivalent
game. Consider an n-player game where the payoff function for the i-th player is
defined by
f (i)(s) = p(i)(si, s−i)v − ci(si) for i = 1, · · · , n, (12)
where
∑
i p
(i)(s) = 1 and p(i)(s) ≥ 0 for all s ≥ 0, ci(0) = 0, ci(·) is continuous,
increasing and convex and v > 0. First, f is a zero-sum equivalent game, since w,
9
defined by
w(i) = (p(i)(si, s−i)− 1
n
)v − 1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
(ci(si)− cj(sj))
for all i, is strategically equivalent to f and is itself a zero-sum game. In Section 3,
we will show that the following function, Φ(s), plays an important role in studying
the equilibrium property of zero-sum equivalent games:
Φ(s) := max
t∈S
n∑
i=1
w(i)(ti, s−i) (13)
for s ∈ S. To illustrate our result, suppose that f (i)’s are given by a relatively simple
form:
f (i)(s) =
si∑
j sj
v − cisi. (14)
Then it is known that the game specified by (14) admits a unique Nash equilibrium
(Szidarovszky and Okuguchi, 1997). From the first order condition of equation (14),
we can find a best response s∗i (s−i)
ci(s
∗
i +
∑
l 6=i
sl)
2 = v
∑
l 6=i
sl.
And via some computation, we find that
Φf(s) = (
∑
i
ci)(
∑
l
sl)− 2
∑
i
√
civ
√∑
l 6=i
sl + (n− 1)v (15)
which is strictly convex5. Later we show that if Φf for zero-sum equivalent game f is
strict convex, then f has a unique Nash equilibrium (Lemma 3.2 and Proposition 3.1).
This method of using the function Φ in equation (13), differently from the existing
5In fact, the best response function accounting for the boundary conditions, si ≥ 0, is given by
s∗i =
{
0 if v
ci
≤∑l 6=i sl√
v
ci
√∑
l 6=i sl −
∑
l 6=i s−l otherwise .
It can be shown that Φf defined for this function achieves the same minimum as the one in equation
(15).
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analysis relying on the special properties of the payoff functions (Szidarovszky and Okuguchi,
1997; Cornes and Hartley, 2005), provide an alternative way of showing the existence
and uniqueness of equilibrium, hence can be extended to more general settings.
Example 3 (Bayesian games). A Bayesian game with finite type spaces can be
viewed as a normal form game by defining a player with a specific type as a new
player (see the type-agent representation in Myerson (1997)). More specifically, con-
sider a two-player game, for which player 2 has two types, τ1 and τ2 :
(g(1), g(2)):=
player 2: τ1
s′1 s
′
2
s1 a, a 0, 0
s2 0, 0 b, b
(h(1), h(2)) :=
player 2: τ2
s′1 s
′
2
s1 a, b 0, 0
s2 0, 0 b, a
where (g(1), g(2)) and (h(1), h(2)) are the payoff functions, given types τ1 and τ2, re-
spectively. In this example, player 1 is not sure whether her partner has common
interests or conflicting interests. Suppose that τ1 and τ2 occur with probabilities p
and 1 − p, respectively. Then, we can introduce a new game in which players 1′,
2′, and 3′ are player 1 in the original game, player 2 with τ1, and player 2 with τ2,
respectively. The payoff function, f , for the new game is defined as follows :
f(s) =

f (1
′)(s1, s2, s3)
f (2
′)(s1, s2, s3)
f (3
′)(s1, s2, s3)

 =

g(1)(s1, s2)g(2)(s1, s2)
0

 p+

h(1)(s1, s3)0
h(2)(s1, s3)

 (1− p).
Here, the payoff function is based on the players’ ex-ante expected payoffs. That is,
the original player 1 ex-ante expects g(1)p+ h(1)(1− p), and the original player 2 ex-
ante expects the sum of the payoffs of players 2′ and 3′. Then, using manipulations
similar to those in the Cournot example, we see that f is strategically equivalent to
a zero-sum game. The reason is that each player’s payoff function is the sum of the
component games played among a subset of players (e.g., f (1
′) = g(1)p+h(1)(1−p)). In
addition, we can show that if g = (g(1), g(2)) and h = (h(1), h(2)) are potential games,
which is straightforward to do, then f is itself a potential game (see Proposition
3.4). Therefore, the Bayesian game given in this example is a potential game and
is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game. Later, we show that every Bayesian
game, embedded as a normal form game with more players, is strategically equivalent
to a zero-sum game in the resulting space of extended normal form games.
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2.3. Preliminary results
For the purpose of exposition we present some preliminary results, some of which
are known and elementary, including some extensions of results from finite games to
continuous strategy games. The advantage of a Hilbert space structure is the natural
concept of orthogonality in terms of the inner product, 〈f, g〉, in (2): we say that
f and g are orthogonal if 〈f, g〉 = 0. In the context of game theory there are two
important orthogonality relations: (i) common interest games and zero-sum games
are orthogonal (Kalai and Kalai (2010)) and (ii) non-strategic games and normalized
games are orthogonal (Hwang and Rey-Bellet (2011); Candogan et al. (2011)). We
first state these two facts and explain their meanings and consequences.
Proposition 2.1. We have the decompositions of the space of all games:
L = C ⊕ Z (16)
L = N ⊕ E (17)
where the direct sum ⊕ means that every game has a unique decomposition into a
sum of two orthogonal components.
Proof. See Corollary in B.1 and see Appendix A for a formal definition of direct
sums.
The first orthogonality relation in (16) implies that common interest games and
zero-sum games are orthogonal to each other, that is
for all f ∈ C and g ∈ Z, 〈f, g〉 = 0, (18)
which is denoted by C ⊥ Z (this property is easy to check, using Fubini’s theorem).
Moreover, any given game f ∈ L can be uniquely written as f = c+z with c ∈ C and
z ∈ Z. Hence, f is a common interest game if and only if its zero-sum component
is z = 0, and f is a zero-sum game if and only if its common interest component is
c = 0. In this way, the concept of orthogonal projections allows us to identify and
separate the different components of a game, representing common and conflicting
interests, respectively.
To understand the second orthogonality relation, note the following simple, but
useful, characterization for a non-strategic game: a function does not depend on a
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variable if and only if the value of the integral of the function with respect to that
variable gives the same value:
Lemma 2.1. A game f is a non-strategic game if and only if
f (i)(s) =
1
mi(Si)
∫
f (i)(ti, s−i)dmi(ti) for all i, for all s . (19)
Proof. Suppose that f satisfies (19). Then, clearly, f (i) does not depend on si for all
i. Now let f ∈ E . Then there exist ζ such that f (i)(s) = ζ (i)(s−i) for all s, which
does not depend on si, for all i. Thus, by integrating, we see that (19) holds.
Using the definition of normalized games in (3) and the characterization for non-
strategic games in (19), we can verify that
for all f ∈ E and g ∈ N , 〈f, g〉 = 0 (20)
which illustrates the decomposition in (17). Thus, any game payoff f can be uniquely
decomposed into n ∈ N and e ∈ E . The game n is called a normalized game since any
game f can be normalized such that it is equivalent to a game with a no non-strategic
component, i.e.,
f ∼ f − ( 1
m1(S1)
∫
f (1)(s1, ·)dm1(s1), · · · , 1
mn(Sn)
∫
f (n)(sn, ·)dmn(sn)). (21)
To identify a potential game (C+ E , Definition 2.3), it is natural to examine how
any given game is “close” to a potential game by decomposing it into a potential
component and a component which fails to be a potential game, that is which is
orthogonal to a potential game. This leads to the decomposition in (22).
Proposition 2.2. We have the following decomposition:
L = (C + E)⊕ (N ∩ Z). (22)
Proof. For finite strategy games, this result easily follows from the decomposition
results of the Hilbert space, presented in Proposition A.2. For continuous strategy
games, the space (C + E) has to be closed, which we proved in Proposition B.1.
The decomposition in (22) shows that every game can be uniquely decomposed
into a potential component and a normalized zero-sum component. Examples of
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normalized zero-sum games include the Rock-Paper-Scissors games and Matching
Pennies games, as explained in the introduction. The decomposition in (22) can be
regarded as a continuum version of the finite game decomposition in Candogan et al.
(2011). However, the difference between the two decompositions is that they coincide
only when the number of strategies of games is the same6 (see Section 6 for more
precise relationships).
2.4. Main decomposition results
Notice that by Definition 2.4 the space of all zero-sum equivalent potential games is
given by
B = (C + E) ∩ (Z + E).
To understand the orthogonal complement of Z + E , we observe that Z ⊥ C
and E ⊥ N from Proposition 2.1. This means that a game which both belongs
to a common interest game (C) and a normalized game (N ) is an element of the
orthogonal complements of Z + E ; i.e., normalized common interest games are the
orthogonal complements of Z + E . More precisely,
N ∩ C ⊂ (Z + E)⊥, (23)
where (A)⊥ := {f ∈ L : 〈f, g〉 = 0 for all g ∈ A}. The non-trivial, converse inclusion
of (23) involves some technical issues for continuous strategy games. In particular,
we need to show that Z+E is a closed subspace of the Hilbert space, L (Proposition
B.1). We then obtain our first main result (Theorem 2.1 (i)).
To understand the orthogonal complement of B, we again use the fact that zero-
sum games are orthogonal to common interest games and the fact that normalized
games are orthogonal to non-strategic games, obtaining that
(N ∩ C) ⊂ B⊥ and (N ∩Z) ⊂ B⊥ (24)
which, in turn, implies
(N ∩ C)⊕ (N ∩Z) ⊂ B⊥. (25)
6In fact the harmonic games in Candogan et al. (2011) are our normalized zero-sum games only
when all the players have the same number of strategies, as in the case of the Rock-Paper-Scissors
and Matching Pennies games.
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Theorem 3.1 (i)
Theorem 3.1 (ii)
Proposition 3.2
Figure 1: Relationships among decompositions. Here, recall that B = (C + E) ∩ (Z + E).
Again, the converse inclusion is based on the facts that the spaces of potential games
and zero-sum equivalent games are closed. The proofs of all these facts yield result
(ii) in Theorem 2.1. We now stand ready to state our main results (see Figure 1).
Theorem 2.1 (Decompositions involving zero-sum equivalent games and
zero-sum equivalent potential games). We have the following two decomposi-
tions:
(i) L = (N ∩ C)⊕ (Z + E)
(ii) L = (N ∩ C)⊕ (N ∩Z)⊕ B
Proof. We show that Z + E and C + E are closed in Proposition B.1. Then from
this, B = (C+ E)∩ (Z + E) is closed as well. The decompositions in (i) and (ii) then
follow from general decomposition results for a Hilbert space presented in Proposition
A.2.
3. Zero-sum equivalent games (Z + E)
In this section, we start with the characterization of Nash equilibrium for any
game in terms of an optimization problem (see Rosen (1965), Bregman and Fokin
(1998), Myerson (1997), Barron (2008), Cai et al. (2015)). We then provide equi-
librium characterizations of zero-sum equivalent games and conditions for zero-sum
equivalent games.
3.1. Optimization problems for Nash equilibria
When we study Nash equilibria of finite games, we will consider both pure and
mixed strategies. Thus, for finite games we let ∆i = {σi ∈ R|Si| :
∑
si∈Si
σi(si) =
1, σi(si) ≥ 0 for all si} with σi(si) being the probability that player i uses strategy
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si. We also extend the domain of the payoff f from S to ∆ = ×ni=1∆i by defining
f (i)(σ) :=
∑
s∈S
f (i)(s)
∏
k
σk(sk). (26)
For continuous strategy games, we mainly consider the set of Nash equilibria in
pure strategies. We consider a class of games for which each player’s best re-
sponse is well-defined and the payoff, when playing a best response, is finite: i.e.,
maxsi∈Si{f (i)(si, s−i)} admits a solution and exists for all i. The following regularity
condition ensures this.
Condition (R). Suppose that Si is non-empty, convex and compact and f
(i) is upper-
semi continuous for all i.
The Nash equilibria for two strategically equivalent games, by definition, are the
same. That is, if f and g satisfy condition (R) and are strategically equivalent, then
the set of all Nash equilibria for f is equal to the set of all Nash equilibria for g.
To obtain an optimization characterization for the Nash equilibria of game f , we
first note that s∗ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
max
t∈S
n∑
i=1
f (i)(ti, s
∗
−i) = f
(i)(s∗) ⇐⇒ max
t∈S
n∑
i=1
(f (i)(ti, s
∗
−i)− f (i)(s∗)) = 0 (27)
To obtain further characterization, we let
Φf(s) := max
t∈S
n∑
i=1
(f (i)(ti, s−i)− f (i)(s)) for s ∈ S (28)
Then s∗ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if Φf (s
∗) = 0 and also since
max
t∈S
n∑
i=1
(f (i)(ti, s−i)− f (i)(s)) ≥ 0
for all s, Φf (s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S. Thus s∗ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
0 = Φ(s∗) = min
s
Φ(s) (29)
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Properties Example
Zero-sum equivalent Convexity/ uniqueness of NE contest games (C)
games under some conditions quasi-Cournot games (C)
Zero-sum equivalent Two-player games: dominant strategy NE Prisoner’s Dilemma (F)
potential games Multilateral symmetric games quasi-Cournot games
Normalized zero-sum Unique uniform mixed Rock-Paper-Scissors games (F)
games strategy NE Matching Pennies games (F)
Normalized common Uniform mixed strategy NE Coordination games
interest games
Table 3: Summary of equilibrium characterizations for game. In the table, (C) and (F)
mean continuous strategy games and finite games, respectively.
In particular, if game f admit a Nash equilibrium, then the minimizer of Φ(s) be-
comes a Nash equilibrium. We summarize these observations in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Assume Condition (R) and let Φf be given by (28). Then, s
∗ is a
minimizer to (29) and Φf (s
∗) = 0 if and only if s∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. This easily follows from the discussion before this lemma.
3.2. Equilibrium characterizations for zero-sum equivalent games
Using the results from the previous section, we provide equilibrium characteriza-
tion for zero-sum equivalent games (see Table 3 for a summary ). Recall that
N ∩Z ⊂ Z ⊂ Z + E .
Thus, the properties that hold for Z + E are most general since these properties
hold for all normalized zero-sum games (N ∩Z), zero-sum games (Z) and zero-sum
equivalent games (Z + E). The results in this section thus automatically carry over
into smaller classes.
If f is a zero-sum equivalent game such that f = w + h, then
Φf(s) = max
t∈S
n∑
i=1
w(i)(ti, s−i) for s ∈ S
which we presented in Section 2.2. Furthermore, by imposing some conditions for the
payoff function, w, and using Φf function, we can derive useful characterizations for
Nash equilibrium of zero-sum equivalent games. To do this, we recall the following
facts, whose proofs are elementary.
17
Lemma 3.2. Suppose that S is convex and that Φf (s) achieves a minimum.
(i) If Φf (s) is convex, the set of minimizers is convex.
(ii) If Φf(s) is strictly convex, the minimizer is unique.
Proof. The proofs are elementary and hence are omitted.
To derive characterizations for Nash equilibrium, we will impose that w(i)(si, s−i)
is (strictly) convex in s−i. If w
(i)(si, s−i) is convex in s−i, w
(i)(si, s−i) is convex in
sj for j 6= i and thus −w(i)(si, s−i) is concave in sj for j 6= i. Also, since w =
(w(1), w(2), · · · , w(n)) is a zero-sum game, we have
w(i)(si, s−i) = −
∑
l 6=i
w(l)(sl, s−l).
Since −w(l)(sl, s−l) is concave in si and the sum of all concave functions is again
concave, w(i) is concave in si for all i, called a concave game.
7 Rosen (1965) shows
that if a game is a concave game, there exists a Nash equilibrium.
As we will show shortly in Corollary 3.1, two-player finite zero-sum equivalent
games typically have a unique equilibrium. Proposition 3.1 below shows that, in
general, the set of Nash equilibria for n-player zero-sum equivalent games is convex
under some plausible conditions. Since a convex set in Rd is connected, the convex
set of Nash equilibria for zero-sum equivalent games is a connected set, generalizing
the property of uniqueness.
Proposition 3.1 (Nash equilibrium for zero-sum equivalent games). Suppose that
f is a zero-sum equivalent game, where f = w + h; w is a zero-sum game and h is
a non-strategic game. Suppose that Condition (R) is satisfied.
(i) If w(i)(si, s−i) is convex in s−i for all si for all i, there exists a Nash equilibrim
and the set of Nash equilibria is convex.
(ii) If w(i)(si, s−i) is strictly convex in s−i for all si for all i, there exists a unique
Nash equilibrium for f .
Proof. We show (ii)((i) follows similarly). Let i and si be fixed. Then from the
discussion before the proposition, w(i) is concave in si for all i. Thus there exists
a Nash equilibrium. We next show that Φ(s) =
∑
imaxsi∈Si w
(i)(si, s−i) is strictly
7We thanks for an anonymous referee for pointing this.
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convex. Let t′, t′′ ∈ S be given. Then u′, u′′ ∈ S be given such that w(i)(u′i, t′−i) =
maxsi∈Si w
(i)(si, t
′
−i) and w
(i)
(u′′i , t
′′
−i) = maxsi∈Si w
(i)(si, t
′′
−i) for all i. Let α ∈ (0, 1)
and t∗ be such that w
(i)
(t∗i , ((1−α)t′+αt′′)−i) = maxsi∈Si w(i)(si, ((1−α)t′+αt′′)−i)
for all i. Then we have
(1− α)Φ(t′) + αΦ(t′′) = (1− α)
∑
i
w(i)(u′i, t
′
−i) + α
∑
i
w
(i)
(u′′i , t
′′
−i)
≥ (1− α)
∑
i
w(i)(t∗i , t
′
−i) + α
∑
i
w
(i)
(t∗i , t
′′
−i) >
∑
i
w(i)(t∗i , (1− α)t′−i + αt′′−i)
= Φ((1− α)t′ + αt′′).
Thus from Lemma 3.2, the minimizer of Φf is unique. Since the Nash equilibrium is
a minimizer of Φf , the Nash equilibrium is unique.
The idea behind Proposition 3.1 is that if w(i) is convex in s−i, then Φf(s) is
convex. The convexity of Φf (s) is analogous to the convexity of the profit function
in a basic microeconomics context (see Figure 2). To explain this, consider a two-
player game and assume that w(1)(s1, s2) is linear (hence convex) with respect to s2;
thus, w(1)(s1, s2) = g(s1) + αs2 for some α ∈ R. Let s01 be the best response against
s02 that yields the maximum payoff to player 1. If we define w˜
(1)(s2) := g(s
0
1)− αs2,
then
w˜(1)(s2) =
{
w(1)(s01, s
0
2) = maxs1 w
(1)(s1, s
0
2), if s2 = s
0
2
w(1)(s01, s2) ≤ maxs1 w(1)(s1, s2), if s2 6= s02.
That is, the payoff from adopting the best response (maxs1 w
(1)(s1, s
0
2)) must be at
least as large as the payoff from adopting the non-best response(w˜(1)(s2)). Since
w˜(1) is linear and maxs1 w
(1)(s1, s2) lies above w˜
(1) with passing through the only
point (s02, w
(1)(s01, s
0
2)) (see Panel A, Figure 2), hence maxs1 w
(1)(s1, s2) is convex.
Clearly, the same argument holds when w(1)(s1, s2) is strictly convex with respect
to s2 (see Panel B, Figure 2). Then the convexity of Φf (s) follows from the sum
of convex functions remaining convex. Rosen (1965) also provides some condition
for the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of a concave game and we compare our
condition and Rosen’s condition in Appendix D.
To further explore the consequences of Proposition 3.1 for finite games, we focus
on a class of games which is non-degenerate. There are several notions of non-
degeneracy in finite games, depending on contexts and problems—such as equilib-
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Figure 2: Illustration of Proposition 3.1. Panel A shows the case when w˜(1)(·) is linear (hence
convex), while Panel B shows the case when w˜(1)(·) is strictly convex.
rium characterizations and classifications of dynamics.8 Since we wish to study the
equilibrium properties of games, we are interested in a class of games that Wilson
(1971) identified—namely games with an odd (hence finite) number of equilibrium.
Condition (N). We call a finite game non-degenerate if it has a finite number of
Nash equilibria.
Next we restrict our attention further to the space of two-player games, often called
bi-matrix games. Even though it is one of the simplest classes that we consider in the
paper, in general it is generally acknowledged that even bi-matrix games are hard to
solve (Savani and von Stengel, 2006). A straightforward consequence of Proposition
3.1 is that, generically, two-player zero-sum equivalent games have a unique Nash
equilibrium.
Corollary 3.1 (two-player finite zero-sum equivalent games). Suppose that f is a
two-player finite zero-sum equivalent game. Then the set of Nash equilibria for f is
convex. If f satisfies Condition (N), the Nash equilibrium is unique.
8Wu and Jiang (1962) define an essential game—a game whose Nash equilibria all change only
slightly against a smaller perturbation to the game and show that almost all finite games are
essential; i.e., the set of all essential games is an open and dense subset of the space of games.
Wilson (1971) introduces a non-degeneracy assumption regarding payoff matrices (more precisely
tensors) and shows that almost all games have an odd (hence finite) number of Nash equilibria. In
the context of evolutionary game theory, Zeeman (1980) also defines a stable game whose dynamic
remains structurally unchanged against a small perturbation.
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Proof. Let f = w + h, where h is a non-strategic game. Then, w(1)(σ1, σ2) is convex
in σ2 and w
(2)(σ1, σ2) is convex in σ1. By Proposition 3.1, the set of Nash equilibria is
convex. Suppose that f has two distinct Nash equilibria, ρ∗ and σ∗, where ρ∗ 6= σ∗.
Then, for all t ∈ (0, 1), (1 − t)ρ∗ + tσ∗ is a Nash equilibrium since the set of Nash
equilibria is convex. This contradicts Condition (N).
3.3. Conditions for zero-sum equivalent games
It is a priori not clear how to determine if a game is a potential game or not.
To check this, some tests have been proposed to determine if a given game is a po-
tential game (Monderer and Shapley, 1996; Ui, 2000; Sandholm, 2010a; Hino, 2011;
Hwang and Rey-Bellet, 2015). Similarly zero-sum equivalent games are not always
easily recognizable. We thus provide some conditions for zero-sum equivalent games.
Recall that Monderer and Shapley (1996) provide an elegant characterization for
potential games, often called the cycle condition, although the verification of this
condition in practice may not be easily implementable (see Hino (2011)). Our first
condition for zero-sum equivalent games is a direct analog of the cycle condition for
potential games (Proposition 3.2).
To explain the idea behind this condition, recall that the Monderer and Shapley
test for two-player games is given by
f (1)(s1, s2)− f (1)(t1, s2)− f (1)(s1, t2) + f (1)(t1, t2)
= f (2)(s1, s2)− f (2)(t1, s2)− f (2)(s1, t2) + f (2)(t1, t2) (30)
for all s1, t1 ∈ S1, s2, t2 ∈ S2. We will show that the condition for zero-sum equivalent
games is similarly given by
f (1)(s1, s2)− f (1)(t1, s2)− f (1)(s1, t2) + f (1)(t1, t2)
+ f (2)(s1, s2)− f (2)(t1, s2)− f (2)(s1, t2) + f (2)(t1, t2) = 0 (31)
for all s1, t1 ∈ S1, s2, t2 ∈ S2. To see that the condition in (31) is a necessary condition
for zero-sum equivalent games, let f = w+h, where w is a zero-sum game and h is a
non-strategic game. Obviously, w satisfies (31) (e.g., w(1)(s1, s2) + w
(2)(s1, s2) = 0).
Also h satisfies (31) too; e.g., h(1)(s1, s2)− h(1)(t1, s2) = 0 since h(1) does not depend
on s1, t1 (a non-strategic game). To see the sufficiency of the condition in (31),
first we fix t = (t1, t2) and use x = (x1, x2) as variables. Let g be a normalized
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common interest game in N ∩ C. Then there exists v such that g = (v, v) and∫
v(x)dmi(xi) = 0 for i = 1, 2. If f
(1)(x1, x2) = f
(1)(t1, x2) + f
(1)(x1, t2)− f (1)(t1, t2)
holds, then∫
g(1)(x1, x2)(f
(1)(x1, x2))dm(x)
=
∫
v(x1, x2)(f
(1)(t1, x2) + f
(1)(x1, t2)− f (1)(t1, t2))dm(x)
=
∫
v(x1, x2)f
(1)(t1, x2)dm(x) +
∫
v(x1, x2)f
(1)(x1, t2)dm(x)−
∫
v(x1, x2)f
(1)(t1, t2)dm(x)
=0 (32)
where the last line follows because of normalization,
∫
v(x)dmi(x) = 0 for i = 1, 2.
Thus, if f satisfies (31), then
f (1)(x1, x2) + f
(2)(x1, x2)
=f (1)(t1, x2) + f
(1)(x1, t2)− f (1)(t1, t2) + f (2)(t1, x2) + f (2)(x1, t2)− f (2)(t1, t2)
holds and we can compute similarly to (32) and find that
〈g, f〉 =
∫
v(x)(f (1)(x) + f (2)(x))dm(x) = 0
This shows that g ⊥ f and our decomposition in Theorem 2.1 (i) concludes that f
is a zero-sum equivalent.
To state a general n-player version, we need the following notations: Let a1, b1 ∈
S1, · · · , an, bn ∈ Sn and let
S(a, b) := {s = (s1, · · · , sn) : si = ai or bi for all i} and
#(s) := the number of ai’s in s (33)
Proposition 3.2 (zero-sum equivalent games). A game f is a zero-sum equiv-
alent game if and only if
n∑
i=1
∑
s∈S(a,b)
(−1)#(s)f (i)(s) = 0 (34)
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for all a1, b1 ∈ S1, · · · , an, bn ∈ Sn.
Proof. See Appendix C.
For the class of bi-matrix games (i.e., two-player finite strategy games), Hofbauer and Sigmund
(1998) give the finite game version of (31) (Exercise 11.2.9 on page 131). When
two-player games are symmetric (hence satisfying the condition that f (1)(s1, s2) =
f (2)(s2, s1); for an example, see games in Table 1)
9, the condition in (31)(or Propo-
sition 3.2) becomes even simpler:
Corollary 3.2. Consider two-player symmetric games: i.e., f (1)(s1, s2) = f
(2)(s2, s1)
for all s1, s2. Then f = (f
(1), f (2)) is a zero-sum equivalent game if and only if
f (1)(s, t)− f (1)(t, t) + f (1)(t, s)− f (1)(s, s) = 0 for all s, t ∈ S1. (35)
Proof. See Appendix C.
Although Proposition 3.2 provides a condition for zero-sum equivalent games
analogous to a cycle condition for potential games in Monderer and Shapley (1996),
checking this condition may be more difficult in practice10. There are also alternative
tests for zero-sum equivalent games, called an integral test and a derivative test,
with which we can determine whether a given game is zero-sum equivalent or not
(Hwang and Rey-Bellet, 2015).
9Here, the first arguments of f (1) and f (2) are the strategies of player 1 and the second argu-
ments of them are the strategies of player 2. Because of abuse of notation, f (i)(s1, s2, · · · , sn) =
f (i)(si, s−i), the meaning of the first argument of f
(2) may create confusion.
10To compare the computational burdens of Monderer and Shapley’s test and the zero-sum
equivalent test, consider an n-player finite game for which each player has the same number of
strategies, say s. Then, we can find the following requirements for the two tests:
numbers of Eqs to be checked
Monderer and Shapley test
(
n
2
)(
s
2
)(
s
2
)× sn−2
Zero-sum equivalent game test
(
s
2
)n
Thus, when n is small, the zero-sum equivalent game test involves less number of equations to be
checked than for Monderer and Shapley’s test, but when n is large, the opposite holds. In general,
when n is large, Monderer and Shapley’s test algorithm is of the order O(s(n+2)), while the zero-sum
equivalent is of the order O(s2n).
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Proposition 3.3. Consider an n-player game, f = (f (1), · · · , f (n)). Suppose that
for all i,
f (i)(s) =
1
ml(Sl)
∫
f (i)(tl, s−l)dml(tl),
for some l. Then, f is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Using Proposition 3.3, we study Bayesian games with finite strategy spaces. For
simplicity, we consider two-player games with the same number of possible types for
both players. That is, player α’s type, τ1, takes the values τ
(i)
1 with probabilities pi,
for i = 1, · · · , k. Similarly, player β’s type, τ2, takes the values τ (i)2 with probabilities
qi, for i = 1, · · · , k. Suppose that a payoff function for a given Bayesian game is
f(s, τ) = (f (1)(sα, sβ, τ1, τ2), f
(2)(sα, sβ, τ1, τ2)). (36)
We consider a 2k-player game in which player i is player α with type τ
(i)
1 if i ≤ k,
and is player β with type τ
(i−k)
2 if i ≥ k + 1. We define a new payoff function, pi, for
the extended 2k-player game:
pi(i)((s1, · · · , sk), (sk+1, · · · , s2k)) =
{∑2k
l=k+1 f
(1)(si, sl, τ
(i)
1 , τ
(l)
2 )piql if i ≤ k∑k
l=1 f
(2)(sl, si, τ
(l)
1 , τ
(i)
2 )plqi if i ≥ k + 1
.
(37)
We then have the following characterizations for Bayesian games, which shows that
the set of all Bayesian games is contained in Z + E .
Proposition 3.4 (Bayesian games). Consider a two-player Bayesian game with
finite type spaces as defined in (36). We have the following characterizations:
(i) The extended normal form game in (37) is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum
game.
(ii) If the underlying game is a potential game for all possible types, then the extended
normal form game in (37) is a potential game.
4. Zero-sum equivalent potential games: B = (Z + E) ∩ (C + E)
4.1. Representation of n-player games
We denote by ζl : S → R a function that does not depend on sl; thus, ζl(s) =
ζl(s−l) for all s. We define the following special class of games, an example of which
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is the quasi-Cournot model in Section 2.2.
Definition 4.1. In the space of n player games, the subspace of n − 1 multilateral
common interest games is defined by
D = {f ∈ L : f (i)(s) :=
∑
l 6=i
ζl(s−l) for all i}.
The class of n − 1 multilateral common interest games includes the set of bilateral
symmetric games in Ui (2000). Conversely, n − 1 multilateral common interest
games belong to a special class of games with interaction potentials in Ui (2000). We
explain the relationship between Ui’s results and ours in Section 6 in more detail.
For example, for a 3-multilateral common interest game (as a 4-player game), the
payoff function for player 1 is given by
f (1)(s1, s2, s3, s4) = ζ2(s1, s3, s4) + ζ3(s1, s2, s4) + ζ4(s1, s2, s3)
and each term f (i) depends only on, at most, n− 1 variables.
In Section 2.2, we demonstrated that the quasi-Cournot model (a 2-multilateral
common interest game) is a potential game which is also strategically equivalent to
a zero-sum game in the case of three players (see equations (9), (10), and (11)).
Proposition 4.1 below shows that, in general, the class of zero-sum equivalent poten-
tial games, B, coincides with the class of n− 1 multilateral common interest games,
D. For two-player games, the games in D have payoffs of the form ζ2(s1) + ζ1(s2)
and this kind of game generically has a dominant strategy, hence the choice of the
name, D (see Corollary 4.1).
Proposition 4.1. We have the following characterizations.
(i) Every zero-sum equivalent potential game is strategically equivalent to an n − 1
multilateral common interest game.
(ii) Every n−1 multilateral common interest game is strategically equivalent to both a
zero-sum game and a common interest game, hence is a zero-sum equivalent potential
game.
That is,
B = D + E
Proof. See Appendix C.
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If a game is a zero-sum equivalent potential game, it can be expressed, up to
strategic equivalence, as a common interest game or a zero-sum game. One advantage
of multilateral common interest games is that the multilateral components explicitly
give expressions for equivalent common interest games (hence potential functions)
and equivalent zero-sum games (hence Φf , in (28)), as the following proposition
shows:
Proposition 4.2 (n-player zero-sum potential equivalent games). An n-player
game with payoff f is a zero-sum equivalent potential game if and only if
(f (1), f (2), · · · , f (n)) ∼
n∑
l=1
(ζl, ζl, · · · , ζl) (38)
∼
∑
i<j
(0, · · · , 0,−ζi + ζj︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−th
, 0, · · ·0, ζi − ζj︸ ︷︷ ︸
j−th
, 0, · · · , 0), (39)
where ζl(·) does not depend on sl.
Proof. See Appendix C.
A similar expression to (38) for potential functions is in Ui (2000) (see the poten-
tial function in Theorem 3 in the cited paper). The first part (38) of Proposition 4.2
shows that n-player zero-sum equivalent potential games are those games in which
every player simultaneously plays n games, each of which is an (n− 1)-player com-
mon interest game, ζl(s−l) (including one in which the payoff does not depend on
the player’s own strategy). Alternatively, these kinds of games can be viewed as si-
multaneously playing dyadic zero-sum games, as the second part (39) of Proposition
4.2 shows. For example, when n = 3,
f ∼ (ζ2 − ζ1, ζ1 − ζ2, 0) + (ζ3 − ζ1, 0, ζ1 − ζ3) + (0, ζ3 − ζ2, ζ2 − ζ3).
In the case of n(≥ 3)-player games, because of the externality of strategic interac-
tions, the payoff functions for the dyadic zero-sum games are generally affected by
other players, as well as by those who are directly involved. For example,
(ζ2 − ζ1, ζ1 − ζ2, 0) = (ζ2(s1, s3)− ζ1(s2, s3), ζ1(s2, s3)− ζ2(s1, s3), 0).
Here, the payoff functions for players 1 and 2 are affected by the strategy choices of
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player 3, as well as those of players 1 and 2.
4.2. Two-player games
We now turn our attention to two-player games in the class of zero-sum equivalent
potential games. In this case, the n− 1 multilateral common interest games are of
the form (ζ2(s1), ζ1(s2)). That is, a player’s payoff depends only on her own strategy
choices. Thus, an immediate consequence of this observation and Proposition 4.2 is
as follows:
Corollary 4.1 (Two-player zero-sum equivalent potential games). A two-
player game with payoff f = (f (1), f (2)) is a zero-sum equivalent potential game if
and only if
(f (1), f (2)) ∼ (ζ1(s2) + ζ2(s1), ζ1(s2) + ζ2(s1)) (40)
∼ (−ζ1(s2) + ζ2(s1), ζ1(s2)− ζ2(s1)).
Suppose that Condition (R) is satisfied. Then, (s∗1, s
∗
2) ∈ (argmaxs1 ζ2(s1), argmaxs2 ζ1(s2))
is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. This immediately follows from Proposition 4.2.
Intuitively, when two players have both common and conflicting interests, the
strategic interdependence effects completely offset each other as in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game. If we consider a symmetric game in which f (1)(s1, s2) = f
(2)(s2, s1)
for all s1, s2 (see footnote 9), condition (40) becomes even stronger:
Corollary 4.2. Suppose that f = (f (1), f (2)) is symmetric; i.e., f (1)(s1, s2) = f
(2)(s2, s1)
for all s1, s2. Then, f is a zero-sum equivalent potential game if and only if
f (1)(s1, s2) = ζ1(s2) + ζ2(s1) for some ζ1 and ζ2. (41)
Proof. If f is a two-player game, then f ∈ D + E if and only if
f (1)(s1, s2) = ζ1(s2) + ζ2(s1) and f
(2)(s1, s2) = ζ
′
1(s2) + ζ
′
2(s1) (42)
for some ζ1, ζ2 and ζ
′
1, ζ
′
2. Now, if f is symmetric, then clearly (41) holds if and only
if (42) holds.
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Using a different approach, Duersch et al. (2012) provide partial results of Corollary
4.2. They show that when a game is a two-player zero-sum game, condition (41)
holds if and only if the game is a potential game. Our result also shows that every
game described by (41) is a zero-sum equivalent potential game. In the context of
population games, Sandholm (2010b) refers to a game strategically equivalent to (41)
as a constant game and shows that a game is a constant game if and only if it is
a potential game with a linear potential function (Proposition 3.2.16 in Sandholm
(2010b)).
In the case of finite games, a stronger characterization than Corollary 4.1 is
possible as follows.
Corollary 4.3. Suppose that a two-player finite zero-sum equivalent potential game
satisfies Condition (N). Then the game has a strictly dominant strategy Nash equi-
librium.
Proof. From the second part of Corollary 4.1, (s∗1, s
∗
2) ∈ (argmaxs1 ζ2(s1), argmaxs2 ζ1(s2))
is a Nash equilibrium. If there are two distinct maximizers, then since the set of
maximizers is convex, there exist infinitely many Nash equilibria, contradicting Con-
dition (N). Thus, the maximizer is unique and constitutes the strictly dominant
Nash equilibrium.
5. Decomposition of normal form games into components with distinctive
Nash equilibrium characterizations
In this section, we present the decomposition of a given game into components
with different Nash equilibrium characterizations, such as the existence of a com-
pletely mixed strategy equilibrium and a strictly dominant strategy equilibrium.
Before presenting the main results, we show that every normalized zero-sum game
and common interest game possess a uniform mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 5.1 (Normalized zero-sum games and normalized common
interest games). Suppose that a game is a normalized zero-sum game or a common
interest game. Then the uniform mixed strategy profile is always a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Recall from equation (5) that dσi(si) =
1
m(Si)
dmi(si) is a uniform mixed
strategy. We define a uniform mixed strategy profile as a product measure of uniform
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mixed strategies: i.e.,
dσ(s) =
∏
i
dσi(si).
Let i and si be fixed. We show that
f (i)(si, σ−i) = 0.
Then, the desired result follows since f (i)(si, σ−i) = 0 = f
(i)(σi, σ−i) for all i and si;
hence, f (i)(σi, σ−i) = maxsi f
(i)(si, σ−i) for all i. First, by the definition of the mixed
strategy extension,
f (i)(si, σ−i) =
∫
s−i∈S−i
f (i)(si, s−i)
∏
l 6=i
dσl(sl).
If f is a normalized zero-sum game, then
f (i)(si, σ−i) = −
∫
s−i∈S−i
∑
j 6=i
f (j)(sj , s−j)
∏
l 6=i
dσl(sl) = −
∑
j 6=i
∫
s−i∈S−i
f (j)(sj , s−j)
∏
l 6=i
dσl(sl) = 0
where the last equality follows from the normalization,
∫
sl∈Sl
f (l)(sl, s−l)dσl(sl) = 0
for all l and Fubini’s Theorem. If f is a common interest game, then similarly
f (i)(si, σ−i) =
∫
s−i∈S−i
v(si, s−i)
∏
l 6=i
dσl(sl) = 0
where the last equality again follows from the normalization,
∫
sl∈Sl
v(sl, s−l)dσl(sl) =
0 for all l. Thus, we obtain the desired result.
The immediate consequence of Corollary 3.1 and Proposition 5.1 is that every
two-player finite normalized zero-sum has a unique uniform mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium if Condition (N) holds. If the numbers of two player’s strategies are
different, all the normalized zero-sum games and normalized common interest games
always have a continuum of Nash equilibria containing a uniform mixed strategy,
violating Condition (N). The reason is as follows. When the player with a smaller
number of strategies plays the uniform mixed strategy, the other player with a larger
number of strategies has many mixed strategies giving the same expected payoff to
any of the first player’s pure strategies. Thus, all these mixed strategies constitute a
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N C N Z B
4,4 -1,1,   1,-1
1, -1   2,2 -2,0
-1,1,   0,-2   2,2
2,2   -1,-1  -1, -1
-1, -1  2,2 -1,-1
-1,-1 -1, -1   2,2
0,0   -1,1   1, -1
1, -1   0,0   -1,1
-1,1   1, -1   0,0
1,1   1,0    1, 0
0, 1   0,0   0,0
0,1    0,0    0,0
∼ + +
(1,0,0)
(0,1,0) (0,0,1)
Potential function  functionΦ  functionΦ
∼ + +
Figure 3: Decomposition of a game into components with distinctive Nash equilibria.
In the bottom line we show the two-player game in Table 1. Since all these games are symmetric,
we find all symmetric Nash equilibria for the original games (three pure strategy Nash equilibria,
(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1), three mixed strategy Nash equilibria involving two strategies (1/2, 1/2, 0),
(1/6, 0, 5/6), (0, 2/3, 1/3), and a completely mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (1/6, 1/2, 1/3)) and
also find all symmetric Nash equilibria for all the other component games. We show these Nash
equilibria using the simplex in the middle line. The top line shows the potential function and the
function Φ. The potential function for the zero-sum equivalent potential game in B is given by p1,
while the function Φ is given 1− p1, where p = (p1, p2, p3) ∈ ∆.
Nash equilibrium, yielding a continuum of Nash equilibria (see a similar discussion
for harmonic games in Candogan et al. (2011)).
Putting all these ingredients together, we obtain the following decomposition of
a given game into components with pure strategy Nash equilibria with a unique
uniform mixed Nash equilibrium and a dominant Nash equilibrium (see Figure 3 for
an illustration of Theorem 5.1).
Theorem 5.1 (Two-player finite strategy games; Nash equilibria). Suppose that f
is a two-player finite strategy game. Then, f can be uniquely decomposed into three
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components:
f ∼ fNC + fNZ + fD
where fNC is a normalized common interest game, fNZ is a normalized zero-sum
game, and fD is a zero-sum equivalent potential game. Suppose that all three compo-
nent games satisfy Condition (N). Then, fNC has a finite number of Nash equilibria
with a uniform mixed strategy and fNZ has a unique uniform mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium, and fD a the strictly dominant strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. This follows from the decomposition theorem, Theorem 2.1, Corollary 4.3,
and Proposition 5.1.
The bottom line of Figure 3 presents again the decomposition of the symmetric
game in Table 1. In the middle line of Figure 3, we show the Nash equilibria of
the original game and the component games in the simplexes. In the top line we
show the potential function for the normalized common interest game in N ∩ C, the
function Φ for the normalized zero-sum game in N ∩ Z, and the function Φ for the
zero-sum equivalent potential game in B. The decomposition of the game illustrates
how each of the Nash equilibria of the original game is related to the Nash equilibria
of component games. For example, the necessary condition for the existence of the
completely mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for the original game is the existence
of the normalized zero-sum or common interest games. Similarly, the existence of
the pure strategy Nash equilibria, (0, 1, 0) and (0, 0, 1), is due to the existence of the
normalized common interest component. Figure 3 also illustrates that if the effect
of one component is weak (for example, in terms of payoff sizes), then the original
game is expected to be devoid of the desirable properties of the weak component.
Do similar characterizations like Theorem 5.1 extend to two-player continuous
strategy games and n-player games? First, Proposition 5.1 holds for continuous
strategy games. In addition, because of the mini-max characterization for two-player
continuous strategy zero-sum games (Sion’s Theorem), we expect that, under some
conditions, the Nash equilibrium for a zero-sum equivalent game is unique and thus
a normalized zero-sum game also has a unique uniform mixed strategy and a zero-
sum equivalent potential game has a strictly dominant strategy (Corollary 4.1). In
fact, using Proposition 3.1, we can provide sufficient conditions for a corresponding
statement for continuous strategy games like Theorem 5.1, which we do not address in
this paper. However, for n-player games, structures of zero-sum equivalent potential
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games are complicated as shown in Proposition 4.1. Thus, we do not have a good
answer yet for n-player games and again leave this question to future research.
Finally, since our characterization relies on the linear structure of payoff functions,
it would be useful to know when Nash equilibria remain invariant through linear
combination. The following lemma shows one sufficient condition in such a direction.
Lemma 5.1. Suppose that s∗ is a Nash equilibrium for f and f ′ which have same
strategy sets. Let ρ, ρ′ > 0. Then s∗ is a Nash equilibrium for ρf + ρ′f ′.
Proof. We have
(ρf + ρ′f ′)(i)(s∗i , s
∗
−i) = ρf
(i)(s∗i , s
∗
−i) + ρ
′(f ′)(i)(s∗i , s
∗
−i)
= ρmax
ti∈Si
f (i)(ti, s
∗
−i) + ρ
′max
ti∈Si
(f ′)(i)(ti, s
∗
−i)
= max
ti∈Si
ρf (i)(ti, s
∗
−i) + max
ti∈Si
(ρ′f ′)(i)(ti, s
∗
−i)
≥ max
ti∈Si
(ρf + ρ′f ′)(i)(ti, s
∗
−i)
Thus, s∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
6. Existing decomposition results
Our decomposition methods extend two kinds of existing results: (i) Kalai and Kalai
(2010), (ii) Hwang and Rey-Bellet (2011); Candogan et al. (2011). First, Kalai and Kalai
(2010) decompose normal form games with incomplete information and study the
implications for Bayesian mechanism designs. Their decomposition is based on the
orthogonal decomposition L = C ⊕ Z in equation (16) in Proposition 2.1.
Second, Hwang and Rey-Bellet (2011) similarly provide decomposition results
based on the orthogonality between common interest and zero-sum games and be-
tween normalized and non-strategic games, mainly focusing on finite games. Candogan et al.
(2011) decompose finite strategy games into three components: a potential compo-
nent, a nonstrategic component, and a harmonic component. When the numbers
of strategies are the same for all players, harmonic components are the same as
normalized zero-sum games, and their harmonic games, in this case, refer to games
that are strategically equivalent to normalized zero-sum games. Also, their potential
component is obtained by removing the non-strategic component from the potential
part (C + E) of the games. Note that we can change our definition of normalized
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zero-sum games to their definition of harmonic games, with all the decomposition
results remaining unchanged. Thus, their three-component decomposition of finite
strategy games follows from Proposition 2.2, (C + E) ⊕ (N ∩ Z) (see the proof of
Corollary 6.1 for more detail).
Corollary 6.1. We have the following decomposition.
L = ((C + E) ∩ N )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Potential Component
⊕ E︸︷︷︸
Nonstrategic
Component
⊕ (N ∩Z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Harmonic
Component
Proof. See Appendix C.
Note that Corollary 6.1 not only reproduces the result of Candogan et al. (2011),
when the number of strategies of the players is the same, but also extends it to the
space of games with continuous strategy sets.
Ui (2000) provides the following characterization for potential games:
f is a potential game if and only if f (i) =
∑
M⊂N
M∋i
ξM for some {ξM}M⊂N for all i
(43)
where ξM depends only on sl, with l ∈M . From our decomposition results, we have
D ⊂ C + E and E ⊂ C +D. In particular, the second inclusion holds because
ζi(s−i) =
n∑
l=1
ζl(s−l)−
∑
l 6=i
ζl(s−l).
Thus, D ⊂ C+E implies that C+D+E ⊂ C+E and E ⊂ C+D implies C+D+E ⊂
C +D. From this, we find
C +D = C +D + E = C + E (44)
Note that all games in C and in D satisfy Ui’s condition in (43); hence, games in
C + D satisfy Ui’s condition. Then, equalities in (44) show that the condition in
(43) is a necessary condition for potential games. The sufficiency of Ui’s condition
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is deduced by adding the non-strategic game
(
∑
M⊂N
M 6∋1
ξM ,
∑
M⊂N
M 6∋2
ξM , · · · ,
∑
M⊂N
M 6∋n
ξM)
to game f satisfying Ui’s condition.
Sandholm (2010a) decomposes n-player finite strategy games into 2n components
using an orthogonal projection. When the set of games consists of symmetric games
with l strategies, the orthogonal projection is given by Γ := I − 1
l
11T , where I is
the l× l identity matrix and 1 is the column vector consisting of all 1’s. Using Γ, we
can, for example, write a given symmetric game, A, as
A = ΓAΓ︸︷︷︸
=(N∩C)⊕(N∩Z)
+ (I − Γ)AΓ + ΓA(I − Γ) + (I − Γ)A(I − Γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=B
. (45)
Thus, our decompositions show that ΓAΓ can be decomposed further into games with
different properties—normalized common interest games and normalized zero-sum
games—and every game belonging to the second component in (45) is strategically
equivalent to both a common interest game and a zero-sum game. Sandholm (2010a)
also shows that a two-player game, (A,B), is potential if and only if ΓAΓ = ΓBΓ. If
P = (P (1), P (2)) is a non-strategic game, it is easy to see that ΓP (1) = O and P (2)Γ =
O, where O is a zero matrix. Thus, the necessity of the condition ΓAΓ = ΓBΓ for
potential games is obtained. Conversely, if ΓAΓ = ΓBΓ, then game (A,B) does not
have a component belonging to N ∩ Z because (ΓAΓ,ΓBΓ) ∈ (N ∩ C) ⊕ (N ∩ Z).
Thus, (A,B) is a potential game.
7. Conclusion
In this study, we developed decomposition methods for classes of games such as
zero-sum equivalent games, zero-sum equivalent potential games, normalized zero-
sum games and normalized common interest games. Our methods rely on the orthog-
onality between common interest and zero-sum games and the orthogonality between
normalized and non-strategic games. Using these, we obtained the first decomposi-
tion of an arbitrary game into two components—a zero-sum equivalent component
and a normalized common interest component—and the second decomposition into
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three components—a zero-sum equivalent potential component, a normalized zero-
sum component, and a normalized common interest component.
Next, for the class of zero-sum game equivalent games, we showed that each game
in this class has a special function, Φ, whose minima are the Nash equilibria of the
underlying game. Using this function, we showed the convexity of the set of all Nash
equilibria (or the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium) of a zero-sum equivalent game
under some plausible conditions. In particular, we showed that almost all two-player
finite zero-sum equivalent games have a unique Nash equilibrium. Using decomposi-
tion, we provided characterizations for zero-sum equivalent games. We then studied
the class of zero-sum equivalent potential games and showed that almost all two-
player finite zero-sum equivalent potential games have a unique strictly dominant
Nash equilibrium. We also showed that normalized common interest games and nor-
malized zero-sum games have a uniform mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Putting
all this together, we showed the decomposition of a two-player finite game into com-
ponent games, each with distinctive Nash equilibrium characterizations (see Figure
3).
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Appendix
In Appendix A, we recall the basic decomposition results for a Hilbert space. In
Appendix B, we explain in more details our decomposition methods and prove the
related results. In Appendix C, we put other proofs and in Appendix D we compare
the condition for uniqueness in Proposition 3.1 and the condition by Rosen (1965).
A. Decompositions of a Hilbert space
Let L be a Hilbert space with an inner product 〈·, ·〉. First, we recall some elemen-
tary facts about subspaces of the Hilbert space, direct sums, orthogonal projections,
and orthogonal decompositions.
If A and B are subspaces of L, then the sum of A and B, A+ B, is defined as
A+ B := {x+ y ; x ∈ A and y ∈ B},
which is again a subspace of L.
A subspace M is called the direct sum of A and B, A⊕ B, if
(1) M = A+ B.
(2) any z ∈M can be uniquely written as the sum z = x+ y with x ∈ A and y ∈ B.
It is easy to see that M = A⊕ B if and only if M = A+ B and A∩ B = {0}.
In general, given subspaces M and A ⊂ M, there are many choices of B such
that M = A ⊕ B. However, in a Hilbert space, there is a canonical choice of B
constructed as follows. If A is a subspace of a Hilbert space, L, we denote by A⊥ its
orthogonal complement. That is
A⊥ := {x ∈ L ; 〈x, y〉 = 0 for all y ∈ A} .
Recall that for any subspace A, A⊥ is a closed subspace, and we have A ⊂ A⊥⊥.
Moreover, A = A⊥⊥ if and only if A is a closed subspace of L. A fundamental
theorem in the theory of Hilbert spaces is the following:
Proposition A.1. Let A be a closed subspace of L. Then we have L = A⊕A⊥.
Proof. See, for example, Kreyszig (1989).
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Related to orthogonal subspaces is the concept of orthogonal projections. An
orthogonal projection, T , is a linear map, T : L → L, which (1) is bounded, (2)
satisfies T 2 = T , and (3) is symmetric (i.e., 〈Tx, y〉 = 〈x, Ty〉) for all x, y ∈ L. Given
an orthogonal decomposition, L = A⊕A⊥, we can define an orthogonal projection,
TA, as
TAz := x if z has the decomposition z = x+ y with x ∈ A, y ∈ A⊥.
Conversely, if T is an orthogonal projection, then from Proposition A.1, one obtains
an orthogonal decomposition
L = ker T ⊕ range(T ) .
Note, that even if two subspaces A, B are closed, A+ B is not always closed.
However, we have the following two lemmas:
Lemma A.1. If A and B are closed orthogonal subspaces, then A⊕ B is closed.
Proof. Consider the orthogonal projections TA and TB. SinceA and B are orthogonal,
we have TATB = 0 and can easily verify that TA + TB is an orthogonal projection
onto A⊕ B, which is then closed.
Lemma A.2. If A is closed and B is finite dimensional, then A+ B is closed.
Proof. Let {zn} be a convergent sequence inA+B (i.e., zn = xn+yn, with xn ∈ A and
yn ∈ B). The sequence {yn} is bounded and by the Bolzano–Weierstrass theorem,
has a convergent subsequence, ynk , which converges to some y in B. Therefore, xnk
is a convergent sequence and, since A is closed, xnk converges to x ∈ A.
The next two results are crucial to our decomposition theorem.
Lemma A.3. Suppose A and B are subspaces of L. Then,
(i) (A+ B)⊥ = A⊥ ∩ B⊥
(ii) If A,B, and A⊥ + B⊥ are closed, then A⊥ + B⊥ = (A ∩ B)⊥.
Proof. Let x ∈ (A+ B)⊥. Then, 〈x, y〉 = 0, for all y ∈ A+ B. Since A, B ⊂ A + B,
we have 〈x, y1〉 = 0, for all y1 ∈ A, and 〈x, y2〉 = 0, for all y2 ∈ B. Thus, (A+B)⊥ ⊂
A⊥ ∩ B⊥. Conversely, let x ∈ A⊥ ∩ B⊥ and let y ∈ A+ B. Then, there exist y1 and
y2 such that y1 ∈ A, y2 ∈ B, and y = y1 + y2. Thus, 〈x, y〉 = 〈x, y1〉 + 〈x, y2〉 = 0.
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Therefore, we have A⊥∩B⊥ ⊂ (A+B)⊥. This proves (i). Then, (ii) is a consequence
of (i): by (i) and since A and B are closed, we have (A⊥+B⊥)⊥ = A⊥⊥∩B⊥⊥ = A∩B.
Since A⊥ + B⊥ is closed, we obtain (ii).
Proposition A.2. Suppose that A, B, A+ B, and A⊥ +B are all closed subspaces.
Then we have the following decompositions:
(i) L = (A+ B)⊕ (A⊥ ∩ B⊥).
(ii) L = (A⊥ + B)⊕ (A ∩ B⊥).
(iii) L = (A ∩ B⊥)⊕ (A⊥ ∩ B⊥)⊕ ((A+ B) ∩ (A⊥ + B))
Proof. (i) follows from Lemma A.3 (i) and Proposition A.1, since A+ B is assumed
to be closed. (ii) also follows from Lemma A.3 (i) and Proposition A.1, since A⊥+B
is closed and A is closed. For (iii), we first deduce from (i) and (ii) that the subspaces
(A ∩ B⊥) and (A⊥ ∩ B⊥) are closed subspaces. Since they are orthogonal to each
other, by Lemma A.1, the direct sum (A ∩ B⊥)⊕ (A⊥ ∩ B⊥) is also closed. Finally,
by applying Lemma A.3 (i) and (ii) again, we obtain
((A ∩ B⊥)⊕ (A⊥ ∩ B⊥))⊥ = (A ∩ B⊥)⊥ ∩ (A⊥ ∩ B⊥)⊥ = (A⊥ + B) ∩ (A+ B).
Applying Proposition A.1 concludes the proof.
B. Decompositions of the space of games
Recall that the space of games is given by the Hilbert space:
L := L2(S,Rn;m) = {f : S → Rn ; f is measurable and ‖f‖ <∞} .
Note that f ∈ L if and only if f (i) ∈ L2(S,R;m) = {g : S → R ; ∫ |g|2dm <∞}, for
each i = 1, 2, · · · , n. We introduce a number of tools for our decompositions.
Lemma B.1. Let Ti : L
2(S,R, m)→ L2(S,R, m) be the map given by
Tig =
1
mi(Si)
∫
g(s)dmi(si) .
Then, Ti is an orthogonal projection. For i 6= j, Ti and Tj commute, and any product
Ti1Ti2 · · ·Tik is an orthogonal projection.
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Proof. That T 2i = Ti follows immediately from the definition, and that Ti is sym-
metric follows from Fubini’s theorem. That Ti and Tj commute again follows from
Fubini’s theorem, and a product of commuting projections is always a projection.
Lemma B.2. The following maps are orthogonal projections:
(i) map Λ : L → L, defined by
Λ(f) := (T1f
(1), · · ·Tnf (n)) .
(ii) map Φ : L → L, defined by
Φ(f) := (
1
n
∑
i
f (i), · · · , 1
n
∑
i
f (i)).
Proof. (i) follows immediately from Lemma B.1, and (ii) follows from an easy com-
putation.
Corollary B.1. The subspaces C (common interest games), Z (zero-sum games), E
(non-strategic games), and N (normalized games) are closed subspaces of L, and we
have
L = C ⊕ Z and L = N ⊕ E .
Proof. We have C = range(Φ), Z = ker(Φ), E = range(Λ), and N = ker(Λ).
Finally, we need the following key proposition:
Proposition B.1. We have the following results:
(i) C + E is closed.
(ii) Z + E is closed.
Proof. For (i), note first that C ∩E is non-empty and contains all constant functions.
For this reason, it will be convenient to treat the constant functions separately. Let
Υ be given by
Υf := (
n∏
l=1
Tlf
(1),
n∏
l=1
Tlf
(2), · · · ,
n∏
l=1
Tlf
(n).)
Since Υ and Φ commute, we decompose
C = C0 ⊕ Cconst and E = E0 ⊕ Econst ,
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where Cconst := range(Υ) ∩ C, C0 := ker(Υ) ∩ C, Econst := range(Υ) ∩ E = range(Υ),
and E0 := ker(Υ) ∩ E . Since Cconst + Econst = Econst , we have
C + E = C0 + E0 + Econst.
Since Econst is finite dimensional, by Lemma A.2, it is now enough to show that C0+E0
is closed.
Let {fk}∞k=1 be a convergent sequence in C0 + E0, with limit f = (f (1), · · · , f (2)).
Then, fk = (f
(1)
k , f
(2)
k , · · · , f (n)k ) has the form
f
(i)
k = φk + Tig
(i)
k ,
for all i, and f
(i)
k converges to f
(i) in L2(S,R;m). We next show that, for every i,
{Tig(i)k }∞k=1 itself is a convergent sequence. Let i be fixed at 1. Since f ∈ C0 + E0, we
have that T1 · · ·Tng(1)k = 0, for all k. Then, we write
T1g
(1)
k = T1(I − T2)g(1)k + T1T2g(1)k
= T1(I − T2)g(1)k + T1T2(I − T3)g(1)k + T1T2T3g(1)k
= · · ·
=
n∑
j=2
(
j−1∏
l=1
Tl)(I − Tj)g(1)k , (B.1)
for each k, and we show that each term, {(∏j−1l=1 Tl)(I−Tj)g(1)k }k, in (B.1) converges.
Since {f (j)k }k converges for all j, so do the differences
f
(1)
k − f (j)k = T1g(1)k − Tig(j)k −→ f (1) − f (j),
for all j. Then, applying T1(I − T2) to f (1)k − f (2)k , we see that {T1(I − T2)g(1)k }k
converges. Applying T1T2(I − T3) to f (1)k − f (3)k , we see that {T1T2(I − T3)g(1)k }k
converges and, in general, applying (
∏j−1
l=1 Tl)(I − Tj) to f (1)k − f (j)k , we see that
{(∏j−1l=1 Tl)(I − Tj)g(1)k }k converges. Thus, every term in (B.1) converges. Therefore,
{T1g(1)k }k converges to some function of the form T1g(1), since range T1 is closed. We
can obviously apply the same argument to Tig
(i)
k , for all i.
Now, since {f (i)k = φk+Tig(i)k }k converges and {Tig(i)k }k converges (in range (Ti)),
the sequence {φk} must converge to some φ. Since C0 and E0 are closed, we have
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(φ, · · · , φ) ∈ C0 and (T1g(1), · · · , Tng(n)) ∈ E0. Therefore, the limit f = (f (1), · · · , f (n))
belongs to C0 + E0, which shows that C0 + E0 is closed.
For (ii), it will be useful to have the following characterization for Z + E :
Claim: f ∈ Z + E if and only if ∑ni=1 f (i) ∈ ker(∏nl=1(I − Tl)).
Proof of the claim: If f ∈ Z + E , then f (i) = g(i) + h(i), where ∑ni=1 g(i) = 0 and
h(i) ∈ range(Ti). Therefore, we have
n∑
i=1
f (i) =
n∑
i=1
Tiq
(i),
for some q(1), · · · , q(n), and clearly, we have (∏nl=1(I − Tl)) (∑ni=1 Tiq(i)) = 0.
Conversely, suppose that
∑n
i=1 f
(i) ∈ ker(∏nl=1(I − Tl)). Then, we have
f (i) = m(i) + n(i),
where n(i) ∈ ker(∏nl=1(I − Tl)) and m(i) ∈ range(∏nl=1(I − Tl)), with ∑ni=1m(i) = 0.
Since ker(
∏n
l=1(I − Tl)) = range(T1) + · · ·+ range(Tn), we have, for each i,
n(i) =
n∑
j=1
Tjn
(i)
j ,
for some {n(i)j }nj=1. In this way, we find {n(i)j }i,j. For each i, we write
n(i) =
(
n∑
j=1
Tjn
(i)
j −
n∑
j=1
Tin
(j)
i
)
+
n∑
j=1
Tin
(j)
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈rangeTi
.
Then, we have
n∑
i=1
(
n∑
j=1
Tjn
(i)
j −
n∑
j=1
Tin
(j)
i ) = 0.
This shows that f ∈ Z + E , and concludes the proof of the claim. 
Now, suppose {fk}∞k=1 ∈ Z + E , such that fk → f. Then,
∑n
i=1 f
(i)
k ∈ ker(
∏n
l=1(I −
Tl)) and
∑n
i=1 f
(i)
k →
∑n
i=1 f
(i). Since ker(
∏n
l=1(I − Tl)) is closed in L2(S,R;m),∑n
i=1 f
(i) ∈ ker(∏nl=1(I − Tl)). Thus, f ∈ Z + E .
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C. Other proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Let F be the set of games that satisfy the condition
given in (34). First, we verify that Z + E ⊂ F . If f ∈ Z, then ∑i f(s) = 0, for all
s, and thus, (34) holds. If f ∈ E and we pick some i ∈ N , then
f (i)(s1, · · · , si−1, ai, si+1, · · · , sn)− f (i)(s1, · · · , si−1, bi, si+1, · · · , sn) = 0
and this holds for any s−i. This implies that
n∑
i=1
∑
s∈S(a,b)
(−1)#(s)f (i)(s) = 0. (C.1)
Thus, we conclude that Z + E ⊂ F .
To show that F ⊂ Z + E , we show that
F ⊥ (N ∩ C) .
Let f ∈ F satisfy condition (34) and let g ∈ N ∩ C; that is, g = (v, v, · · · , v), with∫
v(s)dmi(s) = 0 for every i. Consider ti as fixed and si as varying over Si. Then,
we have, by integrating over si,∫
v(s)f (i)(ti, s−i)dmi(si) = f
(i)(ti, s−i)
∫
v(s)dmi(si) = 0. (C.2)
Now, in condition (34), there are 2n terms involving f (i) and, unless s1 = a1, s2 =
a2 · · · sn = an, f (i) is evaluated as some tj = bj . Thus, if we multiply both sides of
(34) by v(s) and integrate, we find, by (C.1) and Fubini’s theorem,
0 =
∫
v(s)
n∑
i=1
∑
s∈S(a,b)
(−1)#(s)f (i)(s)dm(s)
=
∫
v(s)
n∑
i=1
f (i)(s1, s2, · · · , sn)dm(s).
However, this simply means that 〈f, g〉 = 0, for f ∈ F and g ∈ N ∩ C. From
Theorem 2.1 (i), we find that (N ∩ C) ⊥ F and F = Z + E .
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Proof of Corollary 3.2. From (31), if the game is symmetric, then we obtain the
following condition for a zero-sum equivalent game.
f (1)(s1, s2)+f
(1)(s2, s1)−f (1)(t1, s2)−f (1)(s2, t1)−f (1)(s1, t2)−f (1)(t2, s1)+f (1)(t1, t2)+f (1)(t2, t1) = 0
(C.3)
If we set s = s1 = s2 and t = t1 = t2, then equation (C.3) implies condition in (35).
Now suppose that condition in (35) holds. Then we have
f (1)(s, s) + f (1)(t, t) = f (1)(s, t) + f (1)(t, s)
and thus
f (1)(s1, s2) + f
(1)(s2, s1)− f (1)(t1, s2)− f (1)(s2, t1)
− f (1)(s1, t2)− f (1)(t2, s1) + f (1)(t1, t2) + f (1)(t2, t1)
=f (1)(s1, s1) + f
(1)(s2, s2)− f (1)(t1, t1)− f (1)(s2, s2)
− f (1)(s1, s1)− f (1)(t2, t2) + f (1)(t1, t1) + f (1)(t2, t2)
=0
and thus (C.3) holds.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Let i and l be fixed, and suppose that
f (i)(s) =
1
ml(Sl)
∫
f (i)(sl, s−l)dml.
If l = i, then f = (0, · · · , f (i)(s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−th
, · · · , 0), which is a passive game and, hence, is
strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game. Thus, suppose that l 6= i. Consider a
component, (0, · · · ,−f (i)(s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
l−th
, · · · , 0). Then, this component is again a passive game.
In this way, for all i, we can define a passive game such that the sum of f and all
resulting passive games is zero. Thus, f is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum
game.
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Proof of Proposition 3.4. Recall that
pi(i)((s1, · · · , sk), (sk+1, · · · , s2k)) =
{∑2k
l=k+1 f
(1)(si, sl, τ
(i)
1 , τ
(l)
2 )piql if i ≤ k∑k
l=1 f
(2)(sl, si, τ
(l)
1 , τ
(i)
2 )plqi if i ≥ k + 1
.
(C.4)
Then from Proposition ..., pi is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game. Suppose
that (f (1)(sα, sβ, τ1, τ2), f
(2)(sα, sβ, τ1, τ2)) is a potential game, for each τ1 and τ2. Let
i and l be fixed. Without loss of generality, i ≤ k and l ≥ k + 1. Consider
(0, · · · , f (1)(si, sl, τ (i)1 , τ (l)2 )piql︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−th
, 0, · · · , 0, f (2)(sl, si, τ (l)1 , τ (i)2 )plqi︸ ︷︷ ︸
j−th
, 0 · · · , 0). (C.5)
Since (f (1), f (2)) is a potential game, (f (1), f (2)) ∼ (g, g), for some g. Then,
(g(si, sl), g(si, sl), · · · , g(si, sl), 0︸︷︷︸
i−th
, g(si, sl), · · · , g(si, sl), 0︸︷︷︸
j−th
, g(si, sl), · · · )
is a passive game. Thus, the component in (C.5) is a potential game. Similarly,
we can show that other components are potential games, which shows that pi is a
potential game.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. We first show that
B = (Z + E) ∩ (C + E) = Φ(Λ(L)) + E .
Let f ∈ (Z+E)∩(C+E). Then, f = g1+h1, for g1 ∈ Z and h1 ∈ E , and f = g2+h2,
for g2 ∈ C and h2 ∈ E . Thus, we have
g1 + h1 = g2 + h2, (C.6)
and applying Φ to (C.6), we obtain
f = Φ(h1 − h2) + h2.
Thus, since h1 − h2 ∈ Λ(L), f ∈ Φ(Λ(L)) + E . Conversely, let f ∈ Φ(Λ(L)) + E .
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Obviously, f ∈ C + E . In addition, f = Φ(Λ(g)) + h1, for g ∈ L and h1 ∈ E . Thus,
f = Φ(Λ(g)) + h1 = −(I − Φ)(Λ(g)) + Λ(g) + h1 ∈ Z + E .
This shows that
(Z + E) ∩ (C + E) = Φ(Λ(g)) + E .
Note that
Φ(Λ(L)) + E={f : f (i) =
n∑
l=1
ζl(s−l) for some {ζl}nl=1 and for all i} + E
= {f : f (i) =
∑
l 6=i
ζl(s−l) for some {ζl}nl=1 and for all i}+ E
= D + E .
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Observe that
(
∑
l 6=1
gl(s−l),
∑
l 6=2
gl(s−l), · · · ,
∑
l 6=n
gl(s−l))
∼ (
n∑
l=1
gl(s−l),
n∑
l=2
gl(s−l), · · · ,
n∑
l=1
gl(s−l)).
Hence, the first result follows from D+E = (C+E)∩ (Z +E). For the second result,
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observe that
(
∑
l 6=1
gl,
∑
l 6=2
gl, · · · ,
∑
l 6=n
gl) ∼ (
∑
l 6=1
gl − (n− 1)g1,
∑
l 6=2
gl − (n− 1)g2, · · · ,
∑
l 6=n
gl − (n− 1)gn)
= (
∑
l 6=1
(gl − g1),
∑
l 6=2
(gl − g2), · · · ,
∑
l 6=n
(gl − gn))
= (
∑
l>1
(gl − g1), g1 − g2, g1 − g3, · · · , g1 − gn)
+ (0,
∑
l>2
(gl − g2), g2 − g3, · · · , g2 − gn) + · · ·
+ (0, 0, · · · ,
∑
l>n−1
(gl − gn−1), gn−1 − gn)
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
l>i
(0, · · · , 0,−gi + gj︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−th
, 0, · · ·0, gi − gj︸ ︷︷ ︸
j−th
, 0, · · · , 0).
Proof of Corollary 6.1. This proof follows from Proposition 2.2 by showing that
((C + E) ∩N )⊕ E = C + E . First, observe that (C + E) ∩N ⊂ C + E , which implies
that ((C + E) ∩ N ) ⊕ E ⊂ C + E . Now, let f ∈ C + E . Then, f = g + h, where
g ∈ C, h ∈ E , and g = (v, v, · · · , v). Then, by applying the map, Λ, we find that
f = Λ(f)+ (I−Λ)(f). Obviously, Λ(f) ∈ E . In addition, (I−Λ)(f) = (I −Λ)(g) =
(v − T1v, v − T2v, · · · , v − Tnv) ∈ C + E . Thus, (I − Λ)(f) ∈ (C + E) ∩N .
D. Comparison of the condition for uniqueness in Proposition 3.1 and the
condition by Rosen (1965)
To simplify we consider the two player zero-sum equivalent game given by
f (1)(s1, s2) = w
(1)(s1, s2) + h
(1)(s2)
f (2)(s1, s2) = w
(2)(s1, s2) + h
(2)(s1)
and suppose that w(1) and w(2) are differentiable. Then Proposition 3.1 (ii) requires
that
∂2w(1)
∂s21
< 0 and
∂2w(1)
∂s22
> 0.
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Also, the sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for concave
games by Rosen (1965) (Theorems 2 and 6) is given by(
2r1
∂2w(1)
∂s21
r1
∂2w(1)
∂s1∂s2
+ r2
∂2w(2)
∂s1∂s2
r1
∂2w(1)
∂s1∂s2
+ r2
∂2w(2)
∂s1∂s2
2r2
∂2w(2)
∂s22
)
=
(
2r1
∂2w(1)
∂s21
r1
∂2w(1)
∂s1∂s2
− r2 ∂2w(1)∂s1∂s2
r1
∂2w(1)
∂s1∂s2
− r2 ∂2w(1)∂s1∂s2 −2r2 ∂
2w(1)
∂s22
)
is negative definite for some r1, r2 > 0. Thus Rosen’s condition requires some re-
striction on the cross partial derivatives, while the condition in Proposition 3.1 does
not.
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